Beaneball

Here's a semi-annotated bibliography of the A's blog links about the Kendall trade:

• A win shares analysis from Andrew Koch that doesn't bother with silly things like payroll implications.
• A quick post from Blez at Athletics Nation that appears unabashedly happy.
• An entry from Faust at Athletics Nation that goes more in-depth than any other piece I've seen, mine included. He uses different numbers than I have (notably that the A's will receive $7 million in 2007, rather than $5, which changes things rather drastically), but he comes to the same basic conclusion: the A's got better on the field, but paid a price to do so. I miss the days when the A's methods were unknown and they could basically grab great, unheralded players for cheap, essentially getting better on the field without having to pay a price. Of course, those were also the days immediately following their 75-win days, so getting better was a much easier proposition.
• Mad Dog at Barry Zito Forever adds a roster analysis that I have a few quibbles with:
  1. Is lefty-righty-ness of a lineup really more important than getting your top OBP guy more at bats? If not, as I suspect, then Kendall should be leading off next year.
  2. I really can't see Nick Swisher starting the year batting fifth.
  3. I figure Justin Duchscherer for the fifth spot in the rotation to start the year, with Joe Blanton in Sacramento. When Blanton proves he's ready and Duchscherer proves he's not a long-term solution (the latter of which, by the way, I'm not convinced is going to happen), then we can figure out where to go. Duchscherer's place in the 'pen can be taken by some random lefty Rule 5 pick or a Kirk Saarloos type.
• Finally, Elephants in Oakland adds this, mentioning the A's depth at catcher and talking about the replacements at the pitcher spots recently vacated by Redman and Rhodes, all in his rather inimitable style.

Posted by jason in Baseball, Oakland A's at 11:22 | |

I've built the spreadsheet and run the numbers. Here are the Marginal Dollars per Marginal Win data for 2004, ordered alphabetically first.

MWpMD, alpha

Team	Wins	Losses	Win %	Marginal Wins	Payroll	Marginal Payroll	Marginal Dollars per Marginal Win
Anaheim	92	70	.568	43.4	$101,084,667	$92,684,667	$2,135,591
Arizona	51	111	.315	2.4	$70,204,984	$61,804,984	$25,752,077
Atlanta	96	66	.593	47.4	$88,507,788	$80,107,788	$1,690,038
Baltimore	78	84	.481	29.4	$51,212,653	$42,812,653	$1,456,213
Boston	98	64	.605	49.4	$125,208,542	$116,808,542	$2,364,545
Chicago (A)	83	79	.512	34.4	$65,212,500	$56,812,500	$1,651,526
Chicago (N)	89	73	.549	40.4	$91,101,667	$82,701,667	$2,047,071
Cincinnati	76	86	.469	27.4	$43,067,858	$34,667,858	$1,265,250
Cleveland	80	82	.494	31.4	$34,569,300	$26,169,300	$833,417
Colorado	68	94	.420	19.4	$64,590,403	$56,190,403	$2,896,413
Detroit	72	90	.444	23.4	$46,353,554	$37,953,554	$1,621,947
Florida	83	79	.512	34.4	$42,118,042	$33,718,042	$980,176
Houston	92	70	.568	43.4	$74,666,303	$66,266,303	$1,526,873
Kansas City	58	104	.358	9.4	$47,609,000	$39,209,000	$4,171,170
Los Angeles	93	69	.574	44.4	$89,694,342	$81,294,342	$1,830,954
Milwaukee	67	94	.416	18.8	$27,518,500	$19,118,500	$1,016,069
Minnesota	92	70	.568	43.4	$53,585,000	$45,185,000	$1,041,129
Montreal	67	95	.414	18.4	$43,197,500	$34,797,500	$1,891,168
New York (A)	101	61	.623	52.4	$182,835,513	$174,435,513	$3,328,922
New York (N)	71	91	.438	22.4	$100,629,303	$92,229,303	$4,117,380
Oakland	91	71	.562	42.4	$59,825,167	$51,425,167	$1,212,858
Philadelphia	86	76	.531	37.4	$93,219,167	$84,819,167	$2,267,892
Pittsburgh	72	89	.447	23.8	$32,227,929	$23,827,929	$999,192
San Diego	87	75	.537	38.4	$54,639,503	$46,239,503	$1,204,154
San Francisco	91	71	.562	42.4	$82,019,167	$73,619,167	$1,736,301
Seattle	63	99	.389	14.4	$81,543,833	$73,143,833	$5,079,433
St. Louis	105	57	.648	56.4	$75,633,517	$67,233,517	$1,192,084
Tampa Bay	70	91	.435	21.8	$29,506,667	$21,106,667	$966,653
Texas	89	73	.549	40.4	$54,825,973	$46,425,973	$1,149,158
Toronto	67	94	.416	18.8	$50,017,000	$41,617,000	$2,211,770

Now, ordered by winning percentage:

MWpMD, win%

Team	Wins	Losses	Win %	Marginal Wins	Payroll	Marginal Payroll	Marginal Dollars per Marginal Win
St. Louis	105	57	.648	56.4	$75,633,517	$67,233,517	$1,192,084
New York (A)	101	61	.623	52.4	$182,835,513	$174,435,513	$3,328,922
Boston	98	64	.605	49.4	$125,208,542	$116,808,542	$2,364,545
Atlanta	96	66	.593	47.4	$88,507,788	$80,107,788	$1,690,038
Los Angeles	93	69	.574	44.4	$89,694,342	$81,294,342	$1,830,954
Anaheim	92	70	.568	43.4	$101,084,667	$92,684,667	$2,135,591
Houston	92	70	.568	43.4	$74,666,303	$66,266,303	$1,526,873
Minnesota	92	70	.568	43.4	$53,585,000	$45,185,000	$1,041,129
Oakland	91	71	.562	42.4	$59,825,167	$51,425,167	$1,212,858
San Francisco	91	71	.562	42.4	$82,019,167	$73,619,167	$1,736,301
Chicago (N)	89	73	.549	40.4	$91,101,667	$82,701,667	$2,047,071
Texas	89	73	.549	40.4	$54,825,973	$46,425,973	$1,149,158
San Diego	87	75	.537	38.4	$54,639,503	$46,239,503	$1,204,154
Philadelphia	86	76	.531	37.4	$93,219,167	$84,819,167	$2,267,892
Chicago (A)	83	79	.512	34.4	$65,212,500	$56,812,500	$1,651,526
Florida	83	79	.512	34.4	$42,118,042	$33,718,042	$980,176
Cleveland	80	82	.494	31.4	$34,569,300	$26,169,300	$833,417
Baltimore	78	84	.481	29.4	$51,212,653	$42,812,653	$1,456,213
Cincinnati	76	86	.469	27.4	$43,067,858	$34,667,858	$1,265,250
Pittsburgh	72	89	.447	23.8	$32,227,929	$23,827,929	$999,192
Detroit	72	90	.444	23.4	$46,353,554	$37,953,554	$1,621,947
New York (N)	71	91	.438	22.4	$100,629,303	$92,229,303	$4,117,380
Tampa Bay	70	91	.435	21.8	$29,506,667	$21,106,667	$966,653
Colorado	68	94	.420	19.4	$64,590,403	$56,190,403	$2,896,413
Milwaukee	67	94	.416	18.8	$27,518,500	$19,118,500	$1,016,069
Toronto	67	94	.416	18.8	$50,017,000	$41,617,000	$2,211,770
Montreal	67	95	.414	18.4	$43,197,500	$34,797,500	$1,891,168
Seattle	63	99	.389	14.4	$81,543,833	$73,143,833	$5,079,433
Kansas City	58	104	.358	9.4	$47,609,000	$39,209,000	$4,171,170
Arizona	51	111	.315	2.4	$70,204,984	$61,804,984	$25,752,077

And finally, sorted by Marginal Wins per Marginal Dollar:

MWpMD, mpwmd

Team	Wins	Losses	Win %	Marginal Wins	Payroll	Marginal Payroll	Marginal Dollars per Marginal Win
Cleveland	80	82	.494	31.4	$34,569,300	$26,169,300	$833,417
Tampa Bay	70	91	.435	21.8	$29,506,667	$21,106,667	$966,653
Florida	83	79	.512	34.4	$42,118,042	$33,718,042	$980,176
Pittsburgh	72	89	.447	23.8	$32,227,929	$23,827,929	$999,192
Milwaukee	67	94	.416	18.8	$27,518,500	$19,118,500	$1,016,069
Minnesota	92	70	.568	43.4	$53,585,000	$45,185,000	$1,041,129
Texas	89	73	.549	40.4	$54,825,973	$46,425,973	$1,149,158
St. Louis	105	57	.648	56.4	$75,633,517	$67,233,517	$1,192,084
San Diego	87	75	.537	38.4	$54,639,503	$46,239,503	$1,204,154
Oakland	91	71	.562	42.4	$59,825,167	$51,425,167	$1,212,858
Cincinnati	76	86	.469	27.4	$43,067,858	$34,667,858	$1,265,250
Baltimore	78	84	.481	29.4	$51,212,653	$42,812,653	$1,456,213
Houston	92	70	.568	43.4	$74,666,303	$66,266,303	$1,526,873
Detroit	72	90	.444	23.4	$46,353,554	$37,953,554	$1,621,947
Chicago (A)	83	79	.512	34.4	$65,212,500	$56,812,500	$1,651,526
Atlanta	96	66	.593	47.4	$88,507,788	$80,107,788	$1,690,038
San Francisco	91	71	.562	42.4	$82,019,167	$73,619,167	$1,736,301
Los Angeles	93	69	.574	44.4	$89,694,342	$81,294,342	$1,830,954
Montreal	67	95	.414	18.4	$43,197,500	$34,797,500	$1,891,168
Chicago (N)	89	73	.549	40.4	$91,101,667	$82,701,667	$2,047,071
Anaheim	92	70	.568	43.4	$101,084,667	$92,684,667	$2,135,591
Toronto	67	94	.416	18.8	$50,017,000	$41,617,000	$2,211,770
Philadelphia	86	76	.531	37.4	$93,219,167	$84,819,167	$2,267,892
Boston	98	64	.605	49.4	$125,208,542	$116,808,542	$2,364,545
Colorado	68	94	.420	19.4	$64,590,403	$56,190,403	$2,896,413
New York (A)	101	61	.623	52.4	$182,835,513	$174,435,513	$3,328,922
New York (N)	71	91	.438	22.4	$100,629,303	$92,229,303	$4,117,380
Kansas City	58	104	.358	9.4	$47,609,000	$39,209,000	$4,171,170
Seattle	63	99	.389	14.4	$81,543,833	$73,143,833	$5,079,433
Arizona	51	111	.315	2.4	$70,204,984	$61,804,984	$25,752,077

So, let's first congratulate Arizona on their accomplishment. Not since all the way back in 2003, when the Tigers actually won fewer games than a random team of minimum-wage players should, has a team put up such an astounding number. In Detroit's case, it was hard to notice, because it just turned everything negative, so that they, in some way, paid about $7 million for each loss below replacement they managed to be. Anyway, that $25, almost $26, million figure is astounding, five times worst than the next worse team and three and a half times worst the second worst team in payroll efficiency from 1995 to present, the 2002 Detroit Tigers, who won four more games than these Diamondbacks while spending about $15 million fewer bucks. The top of the list is dominated by the usual bad teams with low payrolls: Tampa Bay, PIttsburgh, and Milwaukee are three of the top five. They're not spending much money, but they're not winning much, either. Of the three, only Milwaukee can get many people excited about their future, so these aren't your 1997-1998 Oakland A's here. On the other hand, Cleveland's team is quite exciting, and this list shows why their front office is so well regarded in the right circles: they appear to be on their way to winning with cheap, homegrown talent. Their payroll is coming down from the excesses of the late '90's and early '00's, but their win total seems to be now moving in the opposite direction, after tracking with the payroll since 1999: 97, 90, 91, 74, 68, and then back to 80 this year. There's no reason to think they won't fight it out with the Twins for the rest of the decade, at least. Minnesota used to lose on the cheap and now they win on the cheap. They're going to have one of the lower MDpMW numbers regardless, but right now, it's a positive one. They make their share of mistakes (Shannon Stewart), but, as slow and methodical as they are about it, they've let a number of their young players come in and have an impact (Johan Santana, Justin Morneau). As I mentioned before, Oakland is slipping: this is the first time they've been over a million bucks per marginal win in the Beane era. That can be chalked up to two things off the top of my head: bad luck combined with overpayment to Jermaine Dye, and four disappointing lefties (Mulder, Zito, Redman, Rhodes, in order of level of disappointment), two of which should have been avoided by the front office (Redman, Rhodes). Having those two guys on the team wasn't negative in itself. Paying them what the A's were paying them was the problem. Somehow, they've managed to turn it into a good thing for the next two years, getting Jason Kendall, but they way they've pushed the punishment for the mistakes back to 2007 reminds me too much of the Forty Niners of the mid- to late-nineties for comfort. I'm sure I'll be able to have plenty of fun with these numbers over the next year. UPDATE: Jesus Christmas. BP just published these numbers on the 19th. I wonder why they didn't Google. Maybe they're subscriber-only. Oh well. I'm leaving this here, though, especially since they don't have their numbers run together as a whole league or in the various sortings I have.

Posted by jason in Baseball at 01:45 | |

The Kendall trade became official sometime between the last post and right now. The only thing that really changes about my analysis is that the A's are actually going to receive $5 million in 2007, not the three million I figured yesterday. That means the A's are adding about $8 million in payroll commitments for 2007, while my figures for the prior years ended up being essentially correct. I'm not sure whether anyone's done the Marginal Payroll / Marginal Wins table for 2004 yet, since Doug Pappas so unfortunately passed, so I think I'll work that up and post it soon. For now, here's Oakland: The A's won 91 games this year, 56.2% of their games. This results in 42.4 marginal wins. Their Opening Day payroll, according to ESPN, was $59,825,167. The minimum payroll, using the MLB minimum salary of $300,000, would be $8,400,000, so the A's marginal payroll comes to $51,425,167. Thus, they spent $1,212,858 per marginal win, the first time in the Billy Beane era that they've spent over a million bucks per win. Anyway, for the A's to keep that level of efficiency after this trade, they'll have to add three wins next year, three or four the year after, and six or seven the year after that over what they would have won if they didn't make this trade. Next year seems like a snap: replacing Damian Miller with Kendall and dropping the two pitchers adds up to quite a bit. The two years after are where things start to get tricky. With the A's relative plethora of catching prospects coming up, where does Kendall fit in? Can the player who wanted to spend his career with one team, the one who waived his no-trade to come to Oakland, be expected to waive that clause again to be sent elsewhere? In other words, I think the A's are stuck with Kendall through the life of his contract. Since the Redman and Rhodes deals expire after 2006 anyway, we can't count their subtraction in the equation anymore, and at that point, the possibility that Kendall will be blocking a young player who might out-perform him is significant. In other words, I'm not as bullish on this trade, even given the new information released today, as I was yesterday.

Posted by jason in Baseball, Oakland A's at 20:04 | |

It appears that the Jason Kendall trade to the Athletics is basically complete, contingent only on Arthur Rhodes and Mark Redman passing their physicals. It's appropriate, then, to start looking at how the trade works out for both sides. Kendall's contract gives him $10, $11, and $13 million in 2005, 2006, and 2007, while, according to Dugout Dollars, Mark Redman will get $4.25 and $4.95 million over two years, while the status of Rhodes's contract is uncertain. Figure an even split at $3.1 million each of the next two years. The A's, then, are taking on $2.65 million in payroll for 2005, $2.95 million for 2006, and the whole $13 million for 2007. The ESPN article here claims that the A's will be making a "small" payment in each of the first two years, while the Pirates will make a payment in 2007 to offset the big Kendall contract in that year. If we assume that "small" payment is something on the order of a million bucks or so, then the A's monetary commitments increase to $3.65 and $3.95 million, respectively. If the Pirates send, say, $3 million the A's way in 2007, then Oakland's burden is reduced to $10 million for that year. Let's just work with those assumptions and we'll adjust them as necessary. Kendall would have been a great guy to have in his 23-26 seasons, before he got hurt, when he regularly put up about 8 WARP per season. Unfortunately, that's not the Kendall the A's are getting. Instead, Oakland has acquired a 31 year-old catcher with a history of health issues who has had trouble cracking slugging percentages of .400 the past two years. But that's the downside. The upside is that despite that complete lack of power, he's still managed to average about 7 WARP a year, though I have to worry about how batting average-driven his offensive value is: he's hit .325 and .319 the last two years after seasons of .283 and .266 the years before that. Kendall doesn't walk as much as he'd need to in order to survive another down year with the batting average (once every 11.6 plate appearances in his career). However, walks aren't the only way to get on base. Kendall has an amazing proclivity for being hit by pitches, getting hit once every 30 times to the plate in his career. When we add in the HBP's, he's getting first for free once every 8.4 trips, which compares favorably to the A's paragon of plate virtue, Scott Hatteberg, who has been walked or hit about once every 8.1 trips in his career. Pittsburgh apparently played as a slight pitcher's park the past two years, so Kendall's numbers are a tiny bit (we're talking one point of OBP here) understated. Oakland, according to Baseball Prospectus depressed run scoring at about the same level, so we won't expect the movement from park to park to change Kendall's numbers. Why don't we go ahead and put him down for, overall, about a six WARP season, as we'll assume that he'll hit about his career average (.306) with his usual ISO's (75-80 OBP, 75-90 SLG). The A's signed Arthur Rhodes on the basis of two good seasons out of the last three, with the bad season being the most recent one. Unfortunately, it appears that a major decline in Rhodes's strikeout rate in 2003 (8 k/9, compared to 10.7 in 2001-2002) augured a decline in all areas; Rhodes's walks, homers, and hits allowed all rose to combine for an ugly 5.12 ERA. According the BP's reliever evaluation tools, he cost the team about three quarters of a win over his 38.7 innings. With the A's plethora of cheap arms (Justin Duchscherer, Kirk Saarloos, Mario Ramos, John Rheinecker, Joe Blanton, Huston Street, Jairo Garcia), I'm pretty sure they can overcome the loss of one old, expensive, crappy lefty, even after accounting for Jim Mecir also playing somewhere else next year. Dumping Rhodes is, even if he has a nice comeback season, addition by subtraction. Then there's Mark Redman, who's becoming the definition of the journeyman pitcher: he'll be pitching for his fifth team in seven years when 2005 rolls around. Redman had a tough year with the A's, particularly in the Coliseum, where he allowed a .981 OPS overall, essentially turning every hitter into Melvin Mora. It's hard to pin down why this may have happened, and it's likely that it's just that old baseball bugaboo, random variation and chance, or "luck" if you want to call it that. The A's may have exploited that road ERA in raising Redman's trade value, essentially saying, "Look, you're getting a guy who had a 2.90 ERA away from home, and he's not going to have to pitch in Oakland next year, so that's pretty much what you'll be getting." Which is, of course, a load of crap. I would be seriously shocked if Mark Redman suddenly turned into Oliver Perez, mostly because he's never had an ERA below 3.59 in his career. Redman's not a bad pitcher, and if that random variation evened out in 2005, he might have made a fine back-end starter for the A's, but with so many cheaper options out there and a potentially damaging offensive hole at catcher (though I'd still like to see Adam Melhuse get a more serious shot), it's a good idea to trade him. From the Pirates's perspective, they get a guy who, as I mentioned, should be a decent starter, though his 2 for 75 career batting line implies that he's a true American League pitcher. He'll also be relatively cheap, especially if the A's are picking up part of the tab on his salary. Assuming Rhodes is traded for something else the Pirates need or shunted to a corner of the 'pen where he's not used much, the trade looks pretty fair from both sides, with the A's getting the better player, but paying the money to make it so. It is funny, though, to see the A's being the team with the payroll flexibility to pull a deal like this with some other poor team begging for them to take a contract off their hands.

Posted by jason in Baseball, Oakland A's at 11:14 | |

As you can see from the left sidebar, I've been reading baseball books lately.

The Fiction

A Ticket for a Seamstitch was odd, to say the least. Mark Harris believes strongly (as he points out in an essay at the beginning of the book) in unflowery writing, apparently putting his faith entirely in a well-constructed story to carry a reader along. He has a point, in that too many writers do try to spice up their writing, and in particular their descriptions of dialogue, and fail miserably, making the writing weird and unnatural, rather than compelling and beautiful.

The Tell All

Ball Four was everything I'd hoped it would be and more. Jim Bouton has a way with words and is really very funny. Even thirty-plus years later, while some of the details are no longer so shocking (drunkards in baseball!), the larger points (the meddlesome, backward nature of coaches, for instance) are almost certainly still true (see Ozzie Guillen). It was really one of the most enjoyable books I've read in a while.

The History

Alan Schwarz's book was, surprisingly, informative and interesting. I figured it'd be interesting, but I didn't necessarily think I'd learn anything terribly new. My knowledge of the backgrounds and contributions of Bill James, Tom Tippett, Craig Wright, and others of that generation was already fairly complete, though the little tidbits and anecdotes that Schwarz throws in kept me interested even in that part: for example, Wright, once famous for having "sabermetrician" on his business card, now lives in the Monterey Bay area (home!) and focuses on his Christian Scientist-ness. The incomplete section of my knowledge, like for many of the readers of the book, I assume, goes back before James and the rest, to Seymour Siwoff, the Elias brothers, George Lindsay, and others, and this book filled that hole admirably.

The Textbook

Unfortunately, I didn't realize that Saving the Pitcher was so much a textbook when I picked it up. I thought it would be more of a general-interest book with all the background a fan needs to understand how pitchers are treated and how they ought to be treated. Instead, it's a book that is really necessary reading for trainers, coaches, doctors, and pitchers, but rather unnecessary for general fans. I'm not sorry I read it, but I wouldn't necessarily have bought it straight away had I taken the time to research the nature of the book beforehand. One of the more unfortunate aspects of the book was the number of errors: there were far too many simple typographical mistakes for me to take the publisher (Ivan R. Dee) too seriously. Hopefully these will be fixed for the paperback.

The Oddball

I have to comment on Liar's Poker as long as I'm talking about books. Michael Lewis (now of Moneyball fame) made his name with his account of working as a bond salesman for Saloman Brothers in the mid- to late-'80's. Paired with Bret Easton Ellis's American Psycho, which was set in the cultural life of people like Lewis (though Lewis was in London, not New York), we can get something of a full picture of the comings and goings of investment banking types in that period.

Posted by jason in Baseball, Reading at 21:51 | |

The A's, in an announcement I nearly missed, paraded their newest minor league acquisition in front of the wire-report reading masses yesterday: Jack Cust! Finally, the player most perfectly suited to join the A's organization has done it! I don't think he's going to become the next Erubiel Durazo or anything, but I don't see why he couldn't be Olmedo Saenz or a more-defensively challenged version of Matt Stairs. His batting averages have declined with every step up the professional chain, but I see no reason why he couldn't, in a part-time role, still hit .257/.353/.514, which is his career (in 74 at-bats) American League batting line. It seems like he's been failing to live up to the hype forever now, but he'll still turn just 26 in January. In other words, he's a perfect low-risk, high-reward player. Cust and his agent, by the way, probably couldn't have made a better choice in picking an organization where he can re-establish himself. Other teams might be willing to give him a shot, but teams like the Dodgers, Blue Jays, and Red Sox all seem to have other obstacles: Los Angeles is in the National League, the Blue Jays have a seeming glut of young outfield talent, and the Red Sox already have David Ortiz doing exactly what Cust would provide, but better.

Posted by jason in Baseball, Oakland A's at 12:29 | |

I just saw this link on Baseball Prospectus's front page. Young math, stat, and econ majors are invited to apply to join baseball front offices, with BP apparently serving as the clearinghouse for the resumes. First of all, when did BP get to be so insider that they're basically the HR department for baseball teams? More importantly, this phrase upsets me: "If you're about to graduate or have recently graduated from a top university ..." (emphasis added). Is that an "Ivy only" statement? Ivies plus Stanford and Chicago? That baseball isn't requiring their new front office members to be former players any more is commendable. That they're only looking at the usual places where every other company looks for their employees is not so commendable. It's frustrating, as someone who made a conscious choice not to pursue those top colleges and to go somewhere that fit me better, to see how far a degree from one of these schools still, in this "modern world," will carry a person. How long is it going to be before corporations realize that hiring people on the basis of how well they did in high school isn't necessarily the way to go? Every time someone gets impressed by a listing of Harvard, Stanford, Yale, or Brown on a resume, they're more impressed by that person's high school performance, which got them to that school, than they are by anything that might help them succeed in their chosen place of business. To make a baseball analogy, it's like getting all excited about a guy who hits well in rookie ball. He must have some skill, because hitting well in rookie ball means you're better than most people who've ever picked up a bat, but it still doesn't mean much at the major league level, just as getting into Chicago shouldn't mean so much at the corporate level. In fact, to carry the analogy too far (my favorite pasttime), the less-well known schools can be seen as the independent leagues of American business.

Posted by jason in Baseball at 16:48 | |

... but they're still the Expos. With a shortstop free agent list that includes Omar Vizquel, Jose Valentin, Edgar Renteria, Pokey Reese, Alex Gonzalez (the former Cub), Nomar Garciaparra, Craig Counsell, Royce Clayton, Orlando Cabrera, and Rich Aurilia, the 'spos signed Cristian Guzman to a four-year, $16.8 million dollar contract. Guzman's pluses: He's still just 26, so he's got room to improve a little more; he's a switch-hitter who hits about equally well from both sides (unlike such faux-switch hitters as Bobby Kielty [I almost put Valentin here, but he's apparently abandoned the right side of the plate]). Unfortunately, neither of those pluses is really performance-related, and in that department, Guzman has a lot of minuses. Over the past three years, he's been a barely-above replacement level offensive shortstop, putting up OBP's that hover around .300 and sub-.400 slugging percentages despite decent batting averages. He's never been a spectacular base-stealer, and in the last three years has been actively bad: he's got 40 steals, but it took him 67 tries to get there. About his only saving grace is that he saved 17 runs above the average shortstop last year, according to BP's numbers. It should be mentioned, however, that this came after five straight years of below-average fielding, and there's no reason to think that players can't have spike defensive years the same way they have spike offensive seasons, and that they might not come in the same season. Check out Derek Jeter's defensive stats for this year, for instance. For all of this wonderfulness, Washington is paying $4.2 million per year. They wouldn't get Nomar or Renteria for that kind of cash, of course, but they could have spent a lot less on one of the older guys and stopped the gap until they could come up with a better solution. There's really nothing wrong with signing over-the-hill players as long as you know what you're getting into and have an actionable plan for the future as well. The A's, for example, appear to have done just that with Damian Miller this past year, and seem to be content to let him go on his merry way this time around. I didn't think Jim Bowden would go out and do something dumb quite this quick.

Posted by jason in Baseball at 16:29 | |

I may not know good teams, but I know bad ones. Thus did I have the Expos also slotted correctly in the NL East. I wasn't fooled by any of the outlandish predictions of an awesome, Yankee-style offense (they wound up scoring just 633 runs, despite playing a number of games in Hiram Bithorn in Puerto Rico). The pitching, meanwhile, was predictably erratic, with Livan Hernandez being the ace of the staff (he ranked 10th in VORP among pitchers, right in the Brad Radke-Jake Peavy range) and nobody else managing to get 20 starts. Zach Day and John Patterson each made 19 starts, and Day was, in fact, the best non-Hernandez starter on the squad, with a 133 RA+. The relief corps boasted a couple of excellent regulars, Luis Ayala and Chad Cordero, who put up 181 and 178 RA+ in 90.3 and 82.7 innings, respectively. Cordero's a young guy, just 22, who had 59 games (83 innings) in the minors, none above A ball, before being called up at the end of last year. He was drafted by the Expos with the expectation that he'd be able to debut quickly, and it's really worked out well. He struck out a guy an inning, gave up a homer every ten, and didn't allow many runs. The only quibble might be to cut out a walk or a walk and a half per nine (43 in 82 innings this year), but that would take him from being a good reliever to being an excellent one. Cordero's rate stats turn into very nice value ones as well: BP has him adding 2.1 wins for the Expos, right between Guillermo Mota and Billy Wagner, around 20 spots from the top of the list. Ayala has an entirely different pedigree. He had three great seasons as a closer in the Mexican League before breaking into Arizona's system. The Rockies had actually given him, signing him in October, 1999, after a 41-save, sub-2 ERA season, but apparently they didn't like what they saw, because he was back in the MEX in 2000. Their loss, and the Diamondbacks's as well, who lost him in the Rule 5 to the 'spos. He had a nice year last year, keeping the ball in the park and not walking anybody, and he followed it up with a better season this time around. Despite his sub-3 ERA, though, his twelve losses and -1.4 expected wins added tell the story of runs allowed at all the wrong times. The hitting side was full of injury and disappointment. Brad Wilkerson hit well, but PECOTA expected better: he finished under his 40th percentile performance expectation, though his health was a nice surprise as he gave the team 688 plate appearances. Tony Batista was bad, finishing below his 25th percentile expectation while sucking life out of the team for a whopping 650 PA's. Not that the 'spos would have had anyone better to put at third if Batista had done the nice thing and gotten an owie, but still. Jose Vidro and Juan Rivera were about the only other bright spots on the team, but Vidro hurt his knee in July and Rivera just didn't play that much. Termell Sledge was ok, but not great, and Nick Johnson missed 87 games with head and back injuries and slugged under .400 when he was healthy. It was essentially just a lousy, lousy year that probably many people saw coming, though I don't know if they saw that it'd be this "blah." If Johnson can ever get healthy and if the team can throw a little average pitching behind Livan Hernandez, the Expos could contend for third place in their division.

Posted by jason in Baseball at 15:32 | |

The NBA boxscore line of the night belongs to Carmelo Anthony. In thirty minutes of a loss to the Jazz, Anthony, shot 3-20, missed all three of this three pointers, got to the free-throw line just twice (missing one of those), and added six rebounds and two assists, which are balanced by his two turnovers. Everyone figured Carmelo for the next big thing, but at this point, I think I'm going to start calling him the next big Jerry Stackhouse. He jacks the shots up with abandon, doesn't make them, and doesn't really add anything to the team peripherally, except for making contributions to the medicinal marijuana stock in the trainer's room.

Posted by jason in Basketball at 08:42 | |

The team I saw play the most in person this year was, I think, the Mets. I'm pretty sure I saw the Yankees three times (once with the baseball nerds, twice with friends from school) and the Mets four (once with the baseball nerds, once with friends from school, once with Austen, once by myself). I also spent a few too many hours watching the Yankees and Mets games at the same time (the PREV button the remote does wonders). This is not to say that I'm familiar with the teams, but I guess I'm more familiar with them, living here in New York, than I am with a lot of teams, even teams that I purport to like more (like the Padres, for example). At least I picked their place in the division right, four games ahead of Montreal for fourth place. I'm going to try not to pile on. It's not hard to find out what went wrong with this team. In fact, it's hard to even call it "went wrong" because it's not like it was a surprise. The Mets had an old, untalented, injury-prone team, with very little upside. The bright spots were supposed to be Jose Reyes, who underperformed and then got hurt again, Kaz Matsui, who underperformed and is now the subject of rumors of a future at second base, Mike Cameron, who hit for power but couldn't make contact (.231 batting average), and Mike Piazza, who was a disaster at first base and got himself hurt in the process. Piazza also showed his age considerably, managing just a .444 slugging percentage for the season. On the pitching side, Tom Glavine and Al Leiter defied Father Time and had very nice years, but the rest of the rotation was full of mediocrities and disappointments: Steve Trachsel, Matt Ginter, Tyler Yates, Scott Erickson, and James Baldwin (yes, you read those last two names correctly) fall in the former category, Kris Benson, Aaron Heilman, and Vic Zambrano in the latter, and Jae Seo in both. The bullpen actually had a bunch of positive contributions from the likes of Mike Stanton, Braden Looper, and Ricky Bottalico. There wasn't anybody in the 'pen who was terribly good or dominant or who you'd actively want to have on your team, however. At least the Mets made things interesting in-season. David Wright came up to play third base and hit pretty well, particularly for power (.232 ISO). Richard Hidalgo was acquired for a bag of Weathers and, while he didn't really hit, he was worth a shot and is easily let go (option declined) this year. On the pitching side, Kris Benson and Victor Zambrano were acquired for a supposed stretch run, which, since the team finished fourt, ends up looking disastrous, but if they could keep Benson long-term, it could turn out fairly well for the team. Zambrano, on the other hand, cost the team Scott Kazmir, which looks disastrous. All in all, on the field, in the news, and in the transactions, it was a Mets kind of year for the Mets. It's just unfortunate for them that that's such a bad (or really, mediocre) thing.

Posted by jason in Baseball at 15:44 | |